The US has begun deploying its own Shahed-style drones in the Middle East — but the same low-cost swarming logic that works against Iran may fall apart in the vast, naval-dominated Pacific.
This month, The War Zone (TWZ) reported that the US has deployed its first operational unit of Low-Cost Uncrewed Combat Attack System (LUCAS) drones—reverse-engineered from Iran’s Shahed-136—to a US Central Command (CENTCOM) base in the Middle East, marking a significant shift in US drone warfare strategy and an effort, officials say, “to flip the script on Iran.”
The newly formed Task Force Scorpion Strike, a roughly two-dozen-person Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) element backed by CENTCOM’s rapid employment task force, fielded the delta-wing drones in late November after fast-tracked development with Arizona-based SpektreWorks.
The US$35,000 systems include variants equipped with gimbaled cameras and miniature satellite datalinks, enabling beyond-line-of-sight control, real-time retargeting, and swarm tactics previously absent in Iranian or Russian Shahed operations.
US officials say the drones—launched from land, mobile platforms, or ships—offer long-range, networked strike options capable of overwhelming air defenses and targeting moving or time-sensitive threats across CENTCOM’s vast theater.
They were deployed after Iran’s mass drone attacks on Israel and Russia’s evolving use of Shahed derivatives in Ukraine demonstrated the coercive potential of low-cost, high-volume strikes.
While not yet used in combat, the US asserts the systems provide an offensive capability against Iran and its proxies, signaling the latter’s intent to match and counter the same asymmetric drone advantage Iran has leveraged regionally.
Aside from the cost, several factors make Iran’s Shahed concept worth looking into – or, in the case of the US, worth copying. Daniel Zampronha and Aline Albuquerque mention in a March 2024 article in the peer-reviewed Advances in Aerospace Science and Technology journal that Shahed-136 has become an effective long-range strike weapon not only because of its extremely low cost but also due to several design and operational advantages.
Latest stories
Myanmar military set to win sham vote — but will a shake-up follow?
Quantum risk is the next boardroom reckoning
China hopes AI can fix its consumer demand problem
Zampronha and Albuquerque say that the Shahed’s delta-wing aerodynamics, large fuel capacity, and piston engine give it cruise-missile-level range (1,500-2,500 kilometers depending on model) and endurance, enabling deep strikes on static infrastructure. They add that its small size, low-altitude flight profile, and low thermal and radar signatures complicate detection and interception.
Furthermore, they say launches from mobile rocket-assisted takeoff (RATO) rails allow rapid salvos that overwhelm defenses and obscure the drone’s origin. They note that the Shahed, built from ubiquitous civilian-grade electronics, is easy to mass-produce despite sanctions, and even when intercepted, it imposes an economic burden on defenders whose missiles cost far more than the drone itself.
But could those advantages carry over to the Pacific – specifically in a US-China conflict over Taiwan? One defining feature of the Pacific theater is the tyranny of distance – a challenge that has significant implications for military capabilities in the region.
Pacific distances demand extreme range and endurance — and that drives up costs dramatically. In the case of drones, those increased costs may break the cost-effectiveness logic that makes Shahed so attractive in the first place.
Still, the US has solutions to address this problem. One approach would be to base drones on surface warships as an additional armament to major surface combatants such as the Arleigh Burke destroyers and Ticonderoga cruisers.
However, the maxed-out condition of the Arleigh Burke destroyers means they may not have space for future upgrades, such as ship-mounted RATO launchers, and the age of the Ticonderoga cruisers could make those upgrades uneconomical, considering their remaining service lives.
Incorporating on-board drone swarm capability for the upcoming DDG(X) could result in repeated design changes and added costs, which can lead to a cost spiral reminiscent of the program failures that led to the cancellation of the Constellation-class frigate.
Another approach would be to enable allies to produce their own Shahed copies. In the case of Taiwan, whose island geography precludes Ukraine-style resupply, self-sufficiency in drone production could be a viable means to harden the self-governing island against attack. It also plays on Taiwan’s strengths in semiconductor technology – reducing reliance on Chinese-made components.
If the US cannot produce such drones at scale, enabling allies to build their own is an option — but Taiwan’s structural barriers make that unlikely.
Hong-Lun Tiunn and other writers highlight in a June 2025 report for Taipei’s Research Institute for Democracy, Society, and Emerging Technology (DSET) that Taiwan lacks formal co-production agreements or inclusion in US drone development and defense collaborations.
They also note that fragmented US-Taiwan interagency cooperation, the absence of a US Congressional designation of Taiwan as a strategic industrial partner, and US preference for a deeper partnership with treaty allies such as Japan and South Korea complicate the situation.
Basing Shahed-type drones on allied territory could also be an option, with the Philippines providing dispersed basing for US drone forces. However, such forward basing may be vulnerable, as shown by Stacie Pettyjohn and Molly Campbell in a September 2025 Center for a New American Security (CNAS) report.
Pettyjohn and Campbell point out that possible US Agile Combat Employment (ACE) bases in Mindanao are around 160 kilometers apart from each other, precluding mutual support in case of a Chinese drone swarm and missile attack that could exhaust limited ammunition and interceptor missile stocks.
Sign up for one of our free newsletters
- The Daily Report Start your day right with Asia Times' top stories
- AT Weekly Report A weekly roundup of Asia Times' most-read stories
The political volatility adds a second layer of uncertainty: Even if US drones could be based in the Philippines, access could shift after 2028. With the pro-US Marcos Jr administration’s popularity ratings and foreign investment in the Philippine economy plummeting after typhoon floods exposed massive corruption in national flood control projects, Vice President Sara Duterte – widely seen as pro-China – could use the situation to cement her position as a top contender in the country’s 2028 presidential elections.
While Duterte has voiced legitimate concerns that the Philippines could be dragged into a US-China conflict over Taiwan, that position poses a challenge to US interests. Duterte could restrict US access to Philippine military facilities in exchange for urgent economic investment from China.
There is also the question of whether Shahed-type drones are the ideal weapon for the Pacific theater, considering the majority of targets may be warships.
The Shahed’s low speed of 185 kilometers per hour and small 40-kilogram warhead may not be enough to attack and destroy major surface combatants such as China’s amphibious assault ships and carrier battlegroups with escorting warships and layered defenses.
Such targets may require a missile like the Harpoon anti-ship missile with a high-subsonic 1,050 kilometers per hour speed, sea-skimming capability, and a 224-kilogram warhead. In the Pacific, long-range anti-ship firepower — not low-cost drones — will decide the fight.
Shahed-type drones may still have niche roles in the Pacific — such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, or decoy for magazine depletion — but they are unlikely to replace heavy anti-ship missiles as primary ship-killing tools.
Sign up here to comment on Asia Times stories
Sign in with Google Or Sign up Sign in to an existing account
Thank you for registering!
An account was already registered with this email. Please check your inbox for an authentication link.
